Cases Pending, co-chaired by
Gretchen Harris Sperry (left) and Catherine Basque Weiler, has been updated to
discuss the Illinois Supreme Court's March Term, which begins Monday, March 12,
2018, with oral arguments scheduled for March 13, 2018 (in Springfield) and
March 15, 2018 (in Urbana at the University of Illinois). A total of 4 cases
will be heard – 1 criminal and 3 civil. The following criminal case is
scheduled for argument this Term:
People v. John Plank, No. 122202: March 15
Below is a summary for the criminal case, People v. John Plank.
Summaries for this case and others pending with the Illinois Supreme Court can
be found in our Cases Pending
publication, accessible to ALA members on the ALA's website.
Defendant John Plank was charged with driving a motor vehicle while his
license was revoked, in violation of 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a). The motor vehicle in
question was a bicycle powered by a gasoline motor. Under the Vehicle Code, a
"low-speed gas bicycle" is not a "motor vehicle." 625 ILCS
5/1-146. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him, arguing that the
Code's definition of "low-speed gas bicycle," 625 ILCS 5/1-140.15, is
unconstitutionally vague. The circuit court granted the motion, declaring
section 1-140.15 unconstitutionally vague on its face in violation of the Due
Process Clauses of the U.S. and Illinois Constitutions.
Section 1-140.15 defines a "low-speed gas bicycle" as
"[a] 2 or 3-wheeled device with fully operable pedals and a gasoline motor
of less than one horsepower, whose maximum speed on a paved level surface, when
powered solely by such a motor while ridden by an operator who weighs 170
pounds, is less than 20 miles per hour."
Before the Illinois Supreme Court, the State argues for reversal on two
bases. First, the statutory definition satisfies due process because it gives a
person of ordinary intelligence – even if he does not weigh 170 pounds – a
reasonable opportunity to determine whether a motorized bicycle is a
"low-speed gas bicycle" and provides a clear and objective standard
for enforcing the law. Second, the statutory definition is facially
constitutional – even if the maximum-speed component is vague as applied to
persons who do not weigh 170 pounds – because any such vagueness does not
extend to all of the definition's applications.
In response, Plank asserts that the statutory definition is vague
because it (1) deprives citizens of fair notice of what is prohibited, noting
that around forty other states have definitions not dependent on the weight of
the rider, and (2) encourages arbitrary enforcement given the many
determinations involved (the horsepower of the motor, its maximum speed on a
level paved surface, whether pedals are operable, whether speed was increased
by human pedaling). Plank also argues that a statutory definition need not be
vague in all of its applications to be unconstitutionally vague.
DISCLAIMER: The Appellate Lawyers Association does not provide legal services or legal advice. Discussions of legal principles and authority, including, but not limited to, constitutional provisions, statutes, legislative enactments, court rules, case law, and common-law doctrines are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice.
